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1 
Covid-19 - Global Stock Markets “Black Swan” 
 
Lucía Morales1✉ , Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan2 
 
 
Abstract 
Global financial markets have entered a state of collective hysteria triggered by the Coronavirus (Covid-
19) detected in Wuhan, China in December 2019 suggesting that Covid-19 is a financial market “black 
swan” event. The impact of Covid-19 on the world’s leading stock markets is examined with the help of 
spectral causality and the well-known Granger causality model. The core research findings indicate that 
markets did not react to volatility levels exhibited by the Shanghai stock market, with China being 
identified as the epicentre of the virus outbreak. Markets awoke to the virus global threat when Italy 
registered its first cases, with the Italian stock market being the one that activated European fears. 
Global uncertainty escalated to reach a global financial dimension with global markets entering in free 
fall by the end of February 2020 due to the lack of active and coordinated responses from politicians 
and monetary authorities.  
Keywords: Covid-19, Black Swan, Global Stock Markets, Causality, Volatility. 
1. Introduction 
The World Health Organization (WHO, 2020) reported on the 7th of March 2020 that COVID-19 
surpassed 100,000 confirmed cases with positive news showing that the spread of the virus can be 
slowed down if universally applicable actions on health care are taken and carefully followed by the 
population. While the world is facing unprecedented times 
surrounded by significant levels of ambiguity and indecision, 
positive news is coming from China that broadcasts a clear 
message of stability.  Beijing is sensing that Covid-19 is under 
control as the country is reporting very low numbers in daily new 
infections (including Wuhan) since early March 2020 (South 
China Morning Post, 10 Mar, 2020). As the WHO continues 
offering advice and encouraging countries to make efforts to 
control the disease; epidemiologists, researchers and health 
professionals are battling the pandemic and trying to gain time 
to develop effective treatments and vaccines; at the same time, 
global political leaders are disappointing by their lack of clarity 
on how to deal with the virus.  
 
 
Figure 1: Coronavirus 
(Source: World Health Organization (2020)-  
Coronavirus from SARS isolated in FRhK-4  
cells available at: https://www.who.int/csr/sars/coronavirus/en/ 
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Countries’ leaders are not able to react in a coordinated and 
organised manner to Covid-19 health threats. The lack of 
united actions that seek to control the propagation of the virus 
have pushed global stock markets into panic and collective 
hysteria registering a black week on Monday 9th and Thursday 
12th March, 20203 with global stock markets plummeting.  
This critical letter offers preliminary insights into stock market 
reactions to Covid-19, by examining its causal effects and 
volatility dynamics. The study makes an original research 
contribution due to the evolving nature of the crisis.  
Figure 2: Coronavirus (Source: World Health  
Organization (2020)- Coronavirus from SARS 
isolated in FRhK-4 cells available at: 
https://www.who.int/csr/sars/coronavirus/en/) 
pedestrian market in Wuhan, China. 2. Causal effects from the Italian stock market, as the world is now 
facing a pandemic that has materialised as a real threat to global economic and financial stability.  3. 
Volatility impact captured by the VIX Index to gain insights into the global dimension of the health crisis.  
The outlined scenarios help gaining an understanding of global stock markets dynamics in the context 
of Covid-19 - a “black Swan”.         
 
2. Global Stock Markets Reaction to COVID-19 
Global stock markets appeared to enjoy some level of stability at the start of the year 2020 with positive 
trends that were disrupted by the emergence of Covid-19 – as a “black swan” that has shaken up the 
world stock markets and that is compromising the stability of the global economy. Financial markets 
“black swans” are described as rare and highly disruptive events. The “black swan” theory was 
introduced by Taleb (2007), where the author explains that “black swan” events exhibit three main 
characteristics: a) a black swan is considered an outlier event, which is an unprecedented and/or 
unexpected event; b) a black swan has substantial influence on related events and things; c) people 
rationalising the black swan event with oversimplified explanations (Lin and Tsai, 2019). The outlined 
features are undoubtedly linked to the global reaction to Covid-19. 
Table 1: Stock Markets Returns 9th, 12th, 16th & 18th March 2020  
 
Core stock markets registered historical losses amid fears of the global pandemic signalling a severe shock to the global economy. 
There is questioning about China’s response to the outbreak, as some concerns regarding its 
international approach have been raised. Chinese authorities claim that their response was a swift one 
and that the existence, virulence and highly contagious effects of the virus were properly communicated 
 
3  See table 1 below for details on stock returns performance. 
     
Countries 9th March 12th March 16th March 18th March 
 China - Shanghai Se A Share     3.05% 1.53% 3.46% 1.85% 
 France - CAC 40                            8.76% 13.10% 5.92% 6.12% 
 Germany - Dax 30                             8.28% 13.05% 5.45% 5.73% 
 Hong Kong - Hang Seng                      4.32% 3.72% 4.12% 4.27% 
 Italy-  FTSEMib 11.85% 18.54% 6.30% 1.28% 
 Japan - Nikkei 225                       5.20%% 4.51% 2.49% 1.69% 
 Spain - IBEX 35                           8.30% 15.15% 8.21% 3.50% 
 United Kingdom - FTSE100                8.00% 11.51% 4.09% 4.13% 
 United States Dow Jones Indus. 8.11% 10.52% 13.84% 6.51% 
 United States S&P 500 Composite        7.90% 9.99% 12.77% 5.32% 
United States NASDAQ Composite       7.57% 9.91% 13.15% 4.82% 
The analysis considers three different scenarios: 1. Causal 
effects from the Shanghai stock exchange to the world 
global markets as Covid-19 epicentre was located in a  
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to the global community projecting an image of political and economic stability. While China focus on 
showing to the world its perceived effective strategy to handle Covid-19, American and European stock 
markets have entered into turmoil as a “black swan” shadow has eclipsed them – “black swans” are 
considered as unlikely events that occur and have a considerable impact due to a lack of preparation. 
Furthermore, “black swans” are identified as events that can reverse the return rate of an investment 
from positive to negative and they are associated with significant levels of market uncertainty (Adams 
and Thornton, 2013; Aleskerov and Egorova (2012), as those exhibited by key global stock markets 
since the virus landed in Europe. Unfortunately, the lack of solidarity among EU countries is showing - 
once again - that these countries are not able to cope with the health crisis, adding growing shadows 
of doubt to the European project due to European leaders’ inability to deal with ever increasing 
challenges. The lack of preparedness to deal with the pandemic in some EU countries is acknowledged 
and this is in part a result of budgetary cuts imposed upon these countries before and after the 2008 
global financial crisis; for example the Italian, French and Spanish health systems are failing to deal 
with increasing numbers of affected people and to provide health system workers with basic equipment 
to protect themselves exacerbating the transmission of the virus. 
Global economies have failed to study  and assess China’s actions to make quick moves that aimed to 
curtail the progression of Covid-19, and on the 9th of March 2020 global stock markets registered 
significant falls in returns showing the investors community concerns on how the health crisis is being 
managed. On one hand, the Shanghai Se A Share Index is showing signs of recovery as returns 
dropped less than 5% during March 2020 black week. On the other hand, global markets were hit in a 
harsh manner as they reacted to plunging oil prices due to evolving events between Russia and Saudi 
Arabia (key oil exporting countries) as Riyadh’s have deep concerns on the raising presence and 
influence of Russia in the Middle East that contributed to fuel the global market hysteria. 
Figure 3: Covid -19 and the Shanghai SE A Price Index and Volatility 
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Pictures Sources: Blackswan and Stock Market picture available at: www.pixabay.com ; 
Coronavirus picture available at: https://unsplash.com/s/photos/coronavirus.   
 
 
As the world faces an unprecedented health crisis, the world stock markets dynamics are showing that 
the investor community is spooked by unfolding events on the management of the spread of the Covid-
19. Russia’s decision not to join the OPEC oil markets generated further uncertainty due to the 
breakdown between Russia and other major producers that lead to the biggest plunger on oil prices. 
An unparallel oil price war unveiled as Russia declined to join OPEC curbing oil production in the wake 
of weakened demand. Saudi Arabia fired back by slashing its oil prices and entering into a price war 
with Russia that led to major falls in global stock market indexes and that were followed suit by gold 
prices, treasury rates and the upsurge of volatility as reflected on the VIX index (see figure 4 and 5 
below and figure 7 in the appendix). 
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Figure 4: Global Stock Markets Indexes 
 
 
The combination of events led to the US oil prices dropping too and with US Treasury yields following 
suit, a situation that contributed to the formation of a perfect storm that dragged stock markets and that 
was reflected in raising levels of stocks and oil volatility indexes (BIS, 2020). Investors are reacting 
strongly to fears of a global economic recession led by Covid-19 and fuelled by the world major oil 
exporting countries confrontation. Gold prices took their historical safe haven role as investors tried to 
react to global uncertainty by pushing gold prices up, but the upward trend was disrupted on the 9th of 
March 2020, as emerging oil prices news sent gold prices in downfall leaving investors puzzled by 
unfolding events.  
 
Figure 5: Key Financial Indicators 
 
 
3. Findings Critical Insights  
The core research findings from the implemented causality analysis on volatility show how Shanghai 
does not report evidence of significant causal effects in the studied global stock markets, being the 
Italian stock market index the one that exhibited a short term impact on key global stock markets that 
appeared to be the trigger and channel for the global turmoil. The outcomes from the spectral causality 
test offered insights on stock markets volatility dynamics indicating that the Shanghai Se A shares index 
had a short term impact on global markets during the early days of the outbreak and disconnected from 
global panic tendencies as the country started to stabilise and control the spread of the virus.  
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Table 2: Causality Findings 
 Cac40 Dax30 Dow Jones FTSE100 Hang Seng Ibex35 Nasdaq Nikkei225 S&P500 
 
Shanghai 
 
FTSEMib 
            
          Granger Causality (Volatility) 
 Cac40 Dax30 Dow Jones FTSE100 Hang Seng Ibex35  Nasdaq  Nikkei225 S&P500 Shanghai FTSEMib 
 
Shanghai  No No No No No No No No No n/a No 
FTSEMib  Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No n/a 
VIX Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes 
Spectral Causality (Volatility) 
 Cac40 Dax30 Dow Jones FTSE100 Hang Seng Ibex35 Nasdaq Nikkei225 S&P500 
 
Shanghai 
 
FTSEMib 
 
Shanghai  Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No n/a Yes  
FTSEMib  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes n/a 
VIX Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes n/a Yes 
*Details on the implemented methodological framework are available in the appendix (see page 7 to 14). 
The global economy is facing a situation of significant social unrest that might exacerbate as political 
leaders take controversial decisions that are stimulated by a lack of strategy and clarity to deal with the 
virus, with some general examples offered below:  
a) Italy’s initial decision to confine more that 16million people with the aim of restricting movement 
led to significant levels of confusion about the country’s efforts to try to curtail the spread of the 
virus ending up in a situation affecting the whole country. 
b) The US administration started to show its lack of strategy when dealing with major cruise lines 
operations. Princess Cruises reported health problems long before the back to back outbreaks 
of the new coronavirus on the Diamond and Grand Princess ships. The US government is failing 
to formulate standard protocols to deal with the outbreaks on cruise ships and in land cases 
that are escalating, and with reported cases of people infected across at least 31 states. 
Furthermore, the country is under severe criticism due to the lack of appropriate testing and 
management of the virus outbreak and because of its delayed and uncoordinated response 
across the country in similar fashion to the European situation. 
c) Many countries such as Israel, Italy, Spain and so on started to impose restrictions on mass 
gatherings and denied entry/re-entry to foreign nationals who have been in several Covid-19 
affected countries. In some cases, these measures have proved to be ineffective due to the 
lack of cooperation from the population leading towards even more restrictive approaches. 
d) Spanish and French health workers’ voiced concerns about their role to spread the virus as 
they are forced to work long shifts under inadequate protection measures; the authorities of 
these countries have failed to supply the required material to hospitals and health workers that 
are becoming a source of contagion.  
Covid-19 might lead towards significant policy mistakes as countries try to deal with the virus outbreak. 
The combination of the health crisis and oil prices shocks could trigger a global economic recession 
that could help China to reposition its global economic strategy and to strengthen its growing role in the 
international economic system as the world dependency on China’s supplies is staggering and is clearly 
reflected in the lack of equipment and basic supplies for hospitals (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and 
Morales, 2019; Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2018). On the other hand, this does ultimately 
put to question the extent and type of the chosen globalisation model with China as the factory of the 
world, even for sensitive products. 
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4. Conclusions 
China’s reaction to Covid-19 has sent a strong message to the world. China is the major supplier of 
basic equipment to hospitals, and countries such as Spain, France and Italy are facing major problems 
to equip their health systems. China’s approach in terms of crisis management aspires as being seen 
as very effective, sending thereby a clear image to the world of a country with an economic and political 
system that was able to counteract high levels of uncertainty. Tight controls applied by political and 
health authorities have aspired to be seen as effective in ensuring stability during different crises.  In 
the world most developed economies, evidence shows that fragile mechanisms have impacted severely 
on the functioning of health systems, with phases of containment and its damaging impact on the 
economy. Because of China’s inability to divulge the true extent of the damage and because of the 
inability of Western leaders to devise a cooperative and coordinated strategy, the pandemic is 
translating gradually into yet another world recession. In particular, the US and the EU as a whole have 
shown inadequate responses and a lack of engagement at the global level at times when international 
coordination and global cooperation is much needed. 
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Appendix 
Econometric Modelling Brief Insights 
Table 3: Data Notation 
Research Sample Countries Returns Volatility 
SHANGHAI SE A SHARE - PRICE INDEX China SHANGHAIR  SHANGHAIVOL  
FRANCE CAC 40 - PRICE INDEX France CACR  CAC40VOL 
DAX 30 PERFORMANCE - PRICE INDEX Germany DAXR DAX30VOL 
HANG SENG - PRICE INDEX Hong Kong HANGSENGR HANGSENGVOL 
FTSE MIB INDEX - PRICE INDEX Italy MIBR  FTSEMIBVOL  
NIKKEI 225 STOCK AVERAGE - PRICE INDEX Japan NIKKEIR  NIKKEI225VOL  
IBEX 35 - PRICE INDEX Spain  IBEXR  IBEXR35VOL 
FTSE 100 - PRICE INDEX UK FTSER  FTSER100VOL 
S&P 500 COMPOSITE - PRICE INDEX US SP500R  SP500VOL  
DOW JONES INDUSTRIALS - PRICE INDEX US DOWR  DOWVOL 
NASDAQ COMPOSITE - PRICE INDEX US NASDAQR  NASDAQVOL  
CBOE SPX VOLATILITY VIX (NEW) - PRICE INDEX US   
Data Frequency: Daily; Time Period: 1st December 2019 – 9th March 2020; Observations: 71. Data Source: DataStream. 
 
Methodology 
1. Descriptive statistics were generated to examine the series mean values, standard deviations 
and normality properties. Correlations were estimated (see table 4 below) showing lower 
correlations between chosen markets and the Shanghai SE A Share and the Hang Seng Index. 
Since the outbreak of the Health Crisis, China’s Shanghai stock market has kept some level of 
stability when compared to the world stock markets panic reaction. 
2. Commonly applied time series testing for stationarity were conducted to ensure that the series 
under study complied with time series basic properties so that the causality framework could 
be implemented. A VAR(p) model was employed to select the appropriate number of lags to be 
used leading to a VAR(2) outcome. The AIC criteria was chosen as the sample size under study 
is small. The research sample under study consists on a representation of 11 stock markets, 
data frequency is daily and the time period under study spans from 1st December 2019 to 9th 
March 2020 counting for 71 observations. 
3. A causality framework was chosen, as the purpose of the research study was to identify causal 
effects from the Shanghai stock exchange that captures global market reaction to Covid-19, as 
the virus outbreak took place in Wuhan, China. The Italian stock exchange was selected to 
identify if global markets reacted to developments in China or if pandemic fears were triggered 
by unfolding events in Italy. The VIX was selected as a proxy to capture stock markets causal 
effects due to increasing levels of uncertainty. The selected research framework was based on 
the implementation of bidirectional causality tests where spectral causality allowed to capture 
market dynamics. While the Granger causality test offered a static dimension that 
complemented and helped to cross check the core research findings. The discussions are 
focused on unidirectional causal effects as the aim of this paper if to examine causal effects 
from the Shanghai Se A Share Index, The FTSE MIB index and the VIX index. 
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Table 4: Stock Markets Returns - Correlations 
 CACR DAXR DOWR FTSER HANGSENGR IBEXR MIBR NASDAQR NIKKEIR SHANGHAIR SP500R 
            
            
CACR  1.00           
DAXR  0.96  1.00          
DOWR  0.76  0.73  1.00         
FTSER  0.96  0.92  0.77  1.00        
HANGSENGR  0.53  0.53  0.34  0.55  1.00       
IBEXR  0.97  0.95  0.78  0.93  0.48  1.00      
MIBR  0.94  0.93  0.70  0.88  0.51  0.93  1.00     
NASDAQR  0.77  0.73  0.96  0.77  0.34  0.79  0.73  1.00    
NIKKEIR  0.62  0.62  0.50  0.64  0.65  0.57  0.53  0.47  1.00   
SHANGHAIR  0.30  0.31  0.25  0.32  0.46  0.28  0.23  0.17  0.52  1.00   
SP500R  0.78  0.74  0.99  0.79  0.34  0.79  0.72  0.98  0.49  0.23  1.00 
 
1. Granger Causality Spectral Causality Modelling 
The well-established Granger Causality test (Granger 1969) was implemented, where two stationary 
variables are regressed against each other in two separate equations.  
 𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀1𝑡 
(1) 
𝑥𝑡 =  𝛼2 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀2𝑡 
(2) 
where  𝑦𝑡  is a dependent variable and 𝑥𝑡  is an independent variable regressed against  𝑦𝑡 . The 
outcomes for unidirectional causality were considered in this paper as the aim of the paper was to 
identify if Covid-19 generated causal effects focused on three explanatory variables (Shanghai SE A 
Share Index, FTSE MIB and VIX). The results from this analysis are presented in table 5 below. 
The implemented frequency domain model is based on a bivariate approach that allowed considering 
the three scenarios under study where Shanghai se A Share was the first scenario to test as Covid-19 
first cases were reported in Wuhan, China. The second scenario examined the impact of Italy and the 
third scenario look at global uncertainty where the VIX index was selected as an appropriate proxy. A 
bivariate causality analysis in the context of the frequency domain brings further evidence to the 
indexes’ behaviour over the sample period. The study by Breitung and Candelon (2006) is based on 
earlier work by Geweke (1982) and Hosoya (1991) that considered the two-dimensional vector 
containing 𝑌𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑡with a finite-order VAR representative of order p, 
Θ(L) (
𝑌𝑡
𝑋𝑡
) = (
Θ11(𝐿) Θ12(𝐿)
Θ21(L) Θ22(𝐿)
) (
𝑌𝑡
𝑋𝑡
) = 𝜀𝑡                                                                                          (3) 
where, Θ(𝐿) = 𝐼 − Θ1𝐿 − ⋯ − Θ𝑝𝐿𝑝  is a 2x2 lag polynomial and Θ1, … . , Θ𝑝 are 2x2 autoregressive 
parameter matrices, with 𝐿𝑘𝑋𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡−𝑘and 𝐿
𝑘𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡−𝑘. The error vector 𝜀𝑡  represents white noise with 
zero mean and 𝐸(𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡
𝑡) = Σ, where Σ is positive and finite. The MA representative of the system is 
(
𝑌𝑡
𝑋𝑡
) = 𝜓(𝐿)𝜂𝑡 = (
𝜓11(𝐿) 𝜓12(𝐿)
𝜓21(𝐿) 𝜓22(𝐿)
) (
𝜂1𝑡
𝜂2𝑡
)          (4)  
with 𝜓(𝐿)𝜂𝑡 = Θ(𝐿)
−1𝐺−1 and G is the lower triangular matrix of the Cholesky decomposition 𝐺′𝐺 =
Σ−1such that 𝐸(𝜂𝑡𝜂𝑡
′ ) = 𝐼 and 𝜂𝑡 = 𝐺𝜀𝑡 . The causality test developed by Geweke (1982) can then be 
written as: 
𝑀𝑋⇒𝛾(Υ) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [1 +
|𝜓12(𝑒
−𝑖𝛾)|2
|𝜓11(𝑒
−𝑖𝛾)|2
]           (5) 
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Within this framework, no Granger causality from 𝑋𝑡 to 𝑌𝑡 with a frequency 𝛾  corresponds to the 
condition  |𝜓12(𝑒
−𝑖𝛾)|2 = 0 . Breitung and Candelon’s (2006) main contribution is to show that this 
condition leads to 
|Θ12(𝑒
−𝑖𝛾)| = | ∑ Θ𝑘,12 cos(𝑘𝛾) | − 𝑖 ∑ Θ𝑘,12 sin(𝑘𝛾) | = 0,
𝑝
𝑘=1
𝑝
𝑘=1         (6) 
where, Θ𝑘,12 is the (1,2) element of Θ𝑘, such that a sufficient set of conditions for no causality is given 
by 
∑ Θ𝑘,12 cos(𝑘𝛾) | = 0
𝑝
𝑘=1  and  ∑ Θ𝑘,12 sin(𝑘𝛾) = 0
𝑝
𝑘=1        (7) 
Hence, we can test the null hypothesis of no Granger causality with a frequency 𝛾 using a standard F-
test for the linear restrictions imposed by the VAR representative of order p, which follows an F(2, T-
2p) distribution for every 𝛾 between 0 and 𝜋, where T is the number of observations in the series 
(Breitung and Candelon, 2006).  The outcome of the spectral causality testing is presented on table 5 
below and on figures 8 to 10. 
Table 5: Granger Causality and Spectral Causality on Volatility 
 Cac40 Dax30 Dow Jones FTSE100 Hang Seng Ibex35 Nasdaq Nikkei225 S&P500 
 
Shanghai 
 
FTSEMib 
            
          
Granger Causality (Volatility) 
Shanghai  
No 
(0.99) 
No 
(0.96) 
No 
(0.71) 
No 
(0.98) 
No 
(0.91) 
No 
(0.95) 
No 
(0.96) 
No 
(0.96) 
No 
(0.96) 
 
n/a 
No 
(0.94) 
FTSEMib  
Yes 
(0.00)* 
No 
(0.62) 
Yes 
(0.00)* 
No 
(0.30) 
No 
(0.27) 
Yes 
(0.00)* 
No 
(0.01)* 
Yes 
(0.00)* 
Yes 
(0.01)* 
No 
(0.94) 
 
n/a 
VIX 
Yes  
(0.00)* 
Yes 
(0.09)* 
No 
(0.62) 
Yes 
(0.00)* 
No 
(0.43) 
Yes 
(0.00)* 
No 
(0.59) 
No 
(0.59) 
No 
(0.58) 
No 
(0.14) 
Yes 
(0.05)* 
 
Spectral Causality (Volatility) 
 Cac40 Dax30 Dow Jones FTSE100 Hang Seng Ibex35 Nasdaq Nikkei225 S&P500 Shanghai FTSEMib 
 
Shanghai  Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No n/a Yes  
FTSEMib  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes n/a 
VIX Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes n/a Yes 
*1%, **5%, ***10% significance level, p-values are presented in brackets. See figures 8 to 10 for spectral causality graphical 
outcomes. 
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Figure 6: Global Price Indexes 
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Figure 7: Stock Markets Volatility 
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Figure 8: Spectral Causality Results 
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Figure 9: Spectral Causality Results 
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Figure 10: Spectral Causality Results 
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